T his paper examines the effect of bank privatization on bank performance and efficiency. To achieve these objectives, relevant banking data published by the Indian Banks' Association for five years -1998-2002 -are analysed using the difference of means test. The partially privatized banks (PPBs) 1 show a significant positive difference in financial performance and efficiency when compared to the fully public sector banks (FPBs). Interestingly, the financial performance of banks already in the private sector is not significantly different from those that are partially privatized. With partial privatization of banks showing encouraging results, this study suggests that the current proposal of the Government of India to bring down its stake further to 33 per cent of the capital may further help in improving the performance and efficiency of these banks. This study also compares India's gradual privatization strategy with that of the other countries like Poland, Mexico, and Mozambique and highlights the lessons that could be learnt.
A study such as this is important for many reasons. Firstly, enhancing efficiency and performance of the public sector banks (PSBs) has been the key objective of reforms in many countries, including India. Talwar (2001) states that "as a part of financial sector reforms and with a view to giving the PSBs operational flexibility and functional autonomy, partial privatization has been authorized as a first step, enabling them to dilute the stake of the Indian government to 51 per cent." Anderson et al. (1997) consider a firm as privatized when more than a third of the shares stand transferred to the private investors (thus, 66 % of shares remain in state ownership). The Reserve Bank of India (2003) stated that "dilution of government stake….could provide greater operational freedom to banks which could have a positive impact on their efficiency." Accordingly, the Government of India embarked upon the dilution of its stake in the PSBs from the early 1990s. The policymakers, stakeholders, and researchers would be interested in knowing the effect of such a dilution on performance and efficiency of the banks that were partially privatized. Secondly, studies on bank privatization are largely confined to the East European, South American or African countries. Studies on bank privatization in Asia and particularly on India are lacking. The RBI (2003) did present a comparison of a sample of five PSBs which divested their government holding with a sample of five wholly government-owned banks. The financial parameters like operating expenses, spread, net profit, asset quality, and capital adequacy were compared but no statistical analysis was done. Lastly, in several countries, postprivatization outcomes were far from satisfactory; however, India's partial privatization, as shown by this study, appears to have resulted in positive outcomes. Prior studies suggested that partial privatization fails to produce any improvement in performance and that mixed state-private firms often do worse than fully stateowned companies (e.g., Boardman and Vining, 1989) . The results of this study, like those of Frydman et al. (1997) , contrast with these findings and could be of interest to researchers.
THE INDIAN BANKING SECTOR: A SNAPSHOT
India is the largest country in South Asia with a huge financial system characterized by many and varied financial institutions and instruments. The Indian financial sector was well-developed even prior to the political independence of the country in 1947. The vastness of the Indian banking system could be gauged from Figure 1 .
At the top of the banking system is the RBI, which is responsible for the prudential supervision of the banks and the non-bank financial institutions and for performing the other central banking functions. India's largest bank-the State Bank of India-and its seven associate banks were brought under social control in the mid-to late fifties. Thereafter, with two successive nationalization of banks, another 19 banks (14 banks in 1969 and six in 1980s) 2 were brought into the public sector. The PSBs occupy a predominant position in the Indian financial system. The important banking indicators of the commercial banks in India are presented in Table 1 . 
PRIVATIZATION, PERFORMANCE, AND EFFICIENCY
As can be seen from Table 1 , the PSBs control over 80 per cent of the banking assets. The banking system has developed well over the years in terms of its geographical coverage, deposit mobilization, and credit expansion. With regard to technology, it is catching up with the developed world. Some banks have started ATMs in the metropolitan centres and are also offering transactional internet banking services. The PSBs were subjected to directed credit, prescribed interest rates, and substantial pre-emption of deposits. The banking services that were mostly confined to the metropolitan areas were expanded to the rural areas. Thus, while at the end of 1964, only 10 per cent of the commercial banks were located in the rural areas, the proportion stood at 40 per cent by 2002. The share of advances in the priority sector 3 increased substantially after nationalization. The overall priority sector credit target is presently 40 per cent of the net bank credit for both the public sector and the private sector banks. For the foreign banks, the target is 32 per cent. Since the early 1990s, the Government of India has implemented many banking sector reforms following the recommendations of the government-appointed Narasimhan Committee (I and II). These include lowering the statutory liquidity ratio from the peak of 38.5 per cent to 25 per cent, the cash reserve ratio at 4.75 percent from its peak of 15 per cent, a gradual deregulation of interest rates on deposits and lending, introduction of prudential norms in line with the international standards and the like. A system of flexible exchange rates on current account has been adopted.
A major drag on the banking system in India is the slow progress in the management of non-performing assets (NPAs). In 2001, the ratio of NPAs to net advances stood at about 15 per cent (Hanson and Kathuria, 2002) . A few banks have much higher levels of NPAs than average and low capital. To support the weak public sector banks, the government injected a substantial amount of capital before the banks were allowed to tap the capital market. Detailed recommendations for restructuring of weak public sector banks (Indian Bank, UCO bank, and United Bank) were given by the RBIappointed Verma Committee (RBI, 1999) . In the early 1990s, the Government of India amended the relevant legislation to provide for a reduction of its stake in the public sector banks to 51 per cent.
LITERATURE REVIEW
The question that we address in this study is: what is the impact of privatization of the banks on bank performance and efficiency? Given that some Indian banks were completely government-owned, for the purpose of this study, a bank that has been allowed to tap capital market to raise capital by diluting government equity has been considered as privatized. Hence all the banks in which dilution of government ownership has taken (8) place are included in the set of privatized banks. Performance refers to financial performance of banks which is measured by relevant accounting ratios, for example, the return on assets (ROA). Efficiency refers to cost efficiency, that is, the ability to produce a given level of output at the lowest cost. To build the conceptual framework for this study, we draw on the literature on the government's participation in the financial markets. Government ownership of the banks as a part of the 'commanding heights' approach was advocated by authors such as Lewis (1950) and Gerschenkron (1962) . The development theories emphasize that government ownership helps channelize savings for long-term projects of strategic interest. The 'political theorists' oppose this view and state that government ownership leads to misallocation of resources and inefficiencies of government enterprises and that there are political motives behind such public ownership. It has long been argued that privatization of firms makes them efficient and perform better. Galal et al. (1994 ), World Bank (1995 , and La Porta and Lopezde-Silanes (1997) support the view that privatization helps improve performance.
However, recent studies in transition economies, for example, by Carlin and Landesman (1997) , Frydman et al. (1998) , and Jones and Mygind (1999) found that postprivatization performance of the firms was poor. The RBI (2003) stated that "as regards the linkage between ownership and performance, international evidence suggests that ownership has limited impact on economic efficiency." Studies that support this position include those of Tulkens (1993) , Altunbus, Evans and Molynenx, (2000) and Denizer, Tarimcilar and Dinc (2000) .
Against this background, the Indian banking sector provides a particularly interesting setting to examine the impact of privatization on the banking firms. The banking sector in India comprises of domestic banks (privatelyowned, partially privatized banks, fully public sector banks) as well as foreign banks. As already stated, in India, the economic reforms started in the early 1990s and the approach of the Government of India towards privatization of banks has been gradual. To begin with, it was proposed to reduce the government stake in the PSBs to 51 per cent. Accordingly, 12 out of the 27 PSBs have issued capital reducing the government stake, though it still continues to be 66 per cent at the minimum. The government is now considering a legislation that allows its stake to be reduced to 33 per cent. The proposal is, however, facing opposition from the bank staff who are questioning the impact on performance and efficiency of the PSBs that raised capital (an argument advanced by the government prior to privatization) before a further reduction of the stake is allowed. The policy makers too are interested in knowing the impact of partial privatization of banks so far. As stated above, the RBI (2003) did present a comparative position of the performance and efficiency ratios of five governmentowned PSBs, five partially privatized government-owned banks (divested PSBs), and those banks that were already in the private sector. However, statistical significance was not tested. Interestingly, no other published study exists, to our knowledge, which has examined this issue in the Indian context. This study, thus, fills an important gap.
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
The data required for this study were obtained from Performance Highlights of Banks, a publication of the Indian Banks' Association, where financial performance and efficiency ratios for each of the banks in India are available. We could readily obtain publications for five years, from 1998 to 2002; our analysis is, thus, restricted to these five years.
The financial performance of the banks was measured using standard measures like ROA, spread to working funds ratio (Spread/WF), establishment expenses to total expenses ratio (EE/TE), loan out ratio (Loans/Deposits) and non-performing assets to net advances ratio (NPA/Net Adv). Efficiency of the banks was measured using accounting ratios such as deposits per employee (depo/staff), advances per employee (loans/staff), and net profit per employee (NP/Staff). These performance and efficiency measures, among others, are used in the literature (for example, Perevalov, Gimadii and Dobrodie, 2000) and also by the Indian Banks' Association and RBI. The KPMG Financial Institutions Performance Survey in Australia also uses, among others, these measures. In recent years, some studies (for example, Bhattacharya et al., 1997 and Sathye, 2003) have measured efficiency of the banks using the mathematical programming technique of Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). In this study, we confine our analysis to the traditional financial ratios to measure performance and efficiency mainly because of ready availability of data thereon.
Two main approaches are generally used to evaluate the impact of privatization on firm performance: the 'synchronic' approach and the 'historical' approach (Frydman et al., 1997) . In the synchronic approach, the performance of the state-owned firms is compared with the firms that were privatized or with those firms that were already in private ownership. Some notable studies in this area include those of Boardman and Vining (1989) , Commander, Fan and Schaffer (1996) and La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes (1997) . In the historical approach, ex ante and ex post privatization performance of the same enterprise is compared. Notable studies that followed this approach include those by Megginson, Nash and Randenborgh (1994) , Earle and Estrin (1997) , and Dewenter and Malatesta (1998) . Given that the data are available for only five years, we use the synchronic approach, that is, we compare the fully state-owned banks with those that are partially privatized. Our data set is not large enough (there are only 27 public sector banks of which 12 are partially privatized) to allow the use of more robust multivariate statistical procedures, hence we confine ourselves to the use of the difference of means test.
Analysing Financial Performance
For the purpose of data analysis, we first divided all the 27 public sector banks into two groups-one group consisting of banks that had issued capital and the other that had not. We analysed the ratios indicated earlier for each of the banks using the difference of means test.
The results of this analysis are presented in Notes: PPBs: partially privatized banks,.PVBs: banks already in private sector. *significant at 10%, **significant at 5% ***significant at 1%.
through the State Bank group. 4 When analysing the performance of the public sector banks, the State Bank group is often distinguished from the other nationalized banks because of its early public ownership and special privileges enjoyed by it. We not only analysed the performance of all the public sector banks (which include the State Bank group) but also separately that of the State Bank group and the other public sector banks' group to provide further information to the readers. We analysed these two groups separately again using the difference of means test. The results are presented in Tables 2 (c) and (d).
Analysing Efficiency
Analysis similar to the above was carried out to assess the impact of partial privatization of the PSBs on efficiency. The results are presented in Tables 3(a) to (d).
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
As can be seen from Table 2 (a), the ROA of the PPBs is significantly greater than that of the FPBs. Interestingly, in respect of the other four financial performance measures, there is no significant difference between these two sets of banks in the recent years. The EE/TE (which refers to salary and other benefits to staff) is not signi- ficantly different, possibly because even though these banks introduced voluntary retirement scheme (VRS), they still have to carry the burden of VRS-related expenditure. The RBI (2003) states that "the operating expenses …. of divested public sector banks witnessed a sharp rise…..mainly due to large outgo on account of VRS-related expenditure incurred by these banks." Earle and Esrin (1997) argue that "….many types of restructuring may impose higher short-run costs." This means that better performance of the PPBs is possibly due to an increase in the productivity of their existing staff. This fact is also borne out by the efficiency ratios. All the three efficiency ratios of the PPBs presented in Table 3 (a) are significant and greater than that of the FPBs. The superior efficiency and performance can be attributed to what Frydman et al. (1997) call as the 'marketization shock' which seems to have geared the staff of the PPBs for better productivity. A non-significant spread/WF ratio between these two sets of banks could mean that these banks are operating in identical or level-playing field in terms of cost of financing and returns as compared to the FPBs. Thus, the PPBs seem to be using improved efficiency as a competitive weapon to better their financial performance. In terms of quality of loans and advances, though on an average, the ratio of NPAs/Net Adv was lower in the PPBs as compared to the FPBs, no significant difference is observed. The NPAs are a drag on the entire banking system in India and this is mainly the legacy of social control over the banks. There is no quick fix for this. The RBI and the Government of India have undertaken several measures to contain the NPA problem, for example, changes in the legislative framework (like the recently introduced Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act 2002 and the establishment of Asset Reconstruction Company), to provide impetus to the recovery efforts by the banks. However, it may take a while before such measures yield significant improvement. Table 2 (b) shows that the PVBs do not have a significantly different ROA as compared to the PPBs. This seems to suggest that the PPBs are fast catching up with the private sector banks in terms of profitability. The RBI (2003) notes that "..there has been a convergence in the financial performance of the partially governmentowned PSBs with old private banks in recent years." However, the PPBs show a significantly higher ratio of EE/TE. As already stated above, VRS-related expenses could have contributed to this situation. A significant positive difference in the Spread/WF ratio is indicative of the ability of the PPBs to tap low cost funds through their extensive branch network.
5 According to RBI's Report on Currency and Finance (2003) , "….as competition intensified, spread tended to narrow……the decline in spread took place across all categories of banks with the decline being more pronounced in the case of new private sector banks." Similarly, no significant difference is noticed between the three efficiency measures of the PPBs and the PVBs as indicated in Table 3 *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%. Next we compare the Indian partial bank privatization experiment with the privatization experiments in the other countries of the world. Various strategies have been used across the world for privatization of banks. These include sale to a strategic investor, initial public offerings (IPOs), voucher system, and sale to employees. India followed the strategy of IPOs, 6 which was similar to that followed in the privatization of Bank Slaski in Poland, where it did not succeed. In the case of Bank Slaski, Dammert and Lasagabaster (2002) find that some of the reasons for the failure of IPO strategy were nascent capital market, inexperienced brokers, and IPO price set at too low a level. India presents a contrast. It already possessed a vibrant capital market and had experienced brokerage houses that could efficiently manage and appropriately price the issue. As stated by Berry (1994) , "Indian banking and finance were well developed even in the colonial period……..there was a significant presence of both foreign and domestic banks and a well developed stock market." The capital market reforms that began in 1992 removed some of the weaknesses in the system like limited information and transparency, regulation on pricing of IPOs, costly trading, limited number of dealers, and accounting standards not reflecting the international practice. The equity market reform took four approaches: the establishment of Securities and Exchange Board of India which was given regulatory powers in 1992, the establishment of the National Stock Exchange in 1992, allowing new mutual fund operators in 1993-94, and the development of a share depository. As stated by Hanson and Kathuria (2002) , these capital market reforms 'contributed to a stock market boom.' Further, as stated by RBI (2003) , the accompanying "progress of banking sector reforms has been a major factor in enhancing the attractiveness of banking sector stocks." The lessons that follow from India's bank privatization experiment are worth noting. In India, the supporting infrastructure like well-developed financial markets (as explained above), a suitable legislative framework, and a sound prudential supervision system (establishment of Banking Ombudsman, establishment of debt recovery tribunals, establishment of an independent Board for Financial Supervision, introduction of CAMELS 7 system, etc.) were brought in place alongside bank privatization. Deolalkar (2000) states that "Changes in banks' reporting requirements, improvement in the quality of on-site supervision, and the establishment of credit information and loan grading and provisioning requirements have all helped….….to lower systemic risk across board." This was not the case in countries like Mexico, Chile, and Mozambique where a few years after privatization, the institutions were experiencing financial problems which quickly spread into a systemic crisis (Dammert and Lasagabaster, 2002) . Further, bank privatization in India has been gradual. Even now 66 per cent of the capital is contributed by the government. Over a period of eight years, during 1993-2001, only 12 out of the 27 public sector banks were partially privatized. In contrast, privatization in Mexico was hasty (Dammert and Lasagabaster, 2002) . In 15 months, 18 commercial banks were sold. The regulatory and supervisory reforms like the adoption of international capital adequacy norms and those indicated above were simultaneously initiated in India. In countries like Mexico and Mozambique, regulatory and supervisory weaknesses were at the root of privatization failures (Dammert and Lasagabaster, 2002) . In sum, there are useful lessons to be learnt from India's gradual privatization strategy which could be of interest to policy makers and researchers in other countries.
CONCLUSION
This study examines the impact of privatization on bank performance and efficiency using data of banks in India for the five-year period -1998-2002. Statistical analysis was performed using the difference of means test for three groups of banks -partially privatized, fully state-owned, and those already in the private sector. Partially privatized banks have performed better as compared to the fully public sector banks in respect of certain financial performance and efficiency parameters. Partially privatized banks also seem to be catching up with the banks already in the private sector. No significant performance or efficiency difference was seen in these two cohorts of banks. Overall, going by the results of this study, partially privatized banks have continued to show improved performance and efficiency in the years after privatization. In several countries, post-priva-tization outcomes were far from satisfactory. However, India's partial privatization, as shown by this study, appears to have resulted in positive outcomes. Prior studies suggested that partial privatization fails to produce any improvement in performance and that mixed stateprivate firms often do worse than fully state-owned companies (Boardman and Vining, 1989) . The results of this study, like those of Frydman et al. (1997) , contrast with these findings and could be of interest to researchers. The Government of India is already considering a measure to bring down its stake further to 33 per cent. Given the positive outcome of partial privatization so far, further dilution of the stakes may help. When compared with the privatization strategies worldwide, it seems that the Indian strategy of gradual privatization has succeeded. It is different from some other countries like Mexico where hasty privatization led to serious problems. Also, while IPOs, as a means to privatization, succeeded in India due to a welldeveloped capital market, it did not in Poland's case of Bank Slaski. Appropriate changes in the regulatory and supervisory regimes also helped a smoother transition and avoided financial crisis in India that some other countries had to face. 
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